In discourse processing, two major problems are understanding the underlying connections between succe~ive dialog utterances and deciding on the content of a coherent dialog response. Thin paper presents a computational model of these tasks for a restricted class of argumentative dialogs. In these dialogs, each response presents a belief that justifies or contradicts another belief presented or inferred earlier in the dialog. Understanding a response involves relating a stated belief to these earlier beliefs, and producing a response involves selecting a belief to justify and deciding upon the set of beliefs to provide as its justification. Our approach is knowledge baaed, using general, common-sense justification rules to recognize how a belief in being justified and to form new justifications for beliefs. This approach provides the ability to recognize and respond to never before seen belief justifications, a necessary capability for any system that participates in dialogs involving disagreements.
Introduction
In discourse processing, two major problems are understanding the underlying connections between successive dialog responses and deciding on the content of a coherent dialog response. This paper presents an initial model that accomplinhes these tasks for one class of argumentative dialogs. In this class, each dialog respouse presents a belief that justifies or contradicts a belief provided earlier in the dialog.
The following dialog fragment is an example:
(1) TIDY: The members of the AI lab should clean it themselves. Each response states one or more plan-oriented beliefs, usually as part of a short chain of reeanning justifying or contradicting a belief provided earlier in the dialog. In (1) , TIDY begins by stating a belief: the lab members should execute the plan of cleaning the lab.
In (2) , SCRUFFY responds with a belief that the lab members executing this plan interferes with their doing research. This belief justifies SCRUFFY~s unstated belief that the lab members should not execute the plan of cleaning the lab, which contradicts TIvY's stated belief in (1). SCRUFPY's underlying reasoning is that the lab members shouldn't clean the lab because it interferes with their executing the more desirable plan of doing research.
In (3), TIDY presents s belief that there's no alternative plan for keeping the lab clean. This belief justifies TIDY's belief in (1). TIDY's underlying reasoning is that the lab members should clean the lab because it's the best plan for the goal of keeping the lab clean, and it's the best plan because it's the only plan that achieves the goal.
Finally, in (4), Scs.uFta'y states a belief that paying a janitor achieves the goal of keeping the lab clean. This contradicts TIDY's stated belief in (3) . It also justifies a belief that the lab members cleaning the lab isn't the best plan for keeping the lab clean, which contradict~ one of the beliefs inferred from (3). SCRUFFY's reasoning is that paying a janitor is a more desirable plan that achieves thin goal.
The remaining responses follow the same pattern. Understanding responses like these involves relating a stated belief to beliefs appearing earlier in the dialog. That requires inferring the participant's underlying reasoning chain and the beliefs it justifies. Producing these responses involves selecting a belief to justify and deciding upon the set of beliefs to provide as its justification. That requires constructing an appropriate reasoning chain that justifies holding any unshared beliefs.
Our focus in this paper is on an initial method for representing, recognising, and producing the belief justifications underlying dialog responses that provide coherent defenses of why beliefs are held. Given our assumption, understanding a response it equivalent to recogniting which justification rules were chained together and instantiated to form it, determining which belief to address in a response it equivalent to determining which beliefs in a chain of instantiated justification rules axe not shared, and producing a justification is equivalent to selecting and instantiating justification rules with beliefs from memory.
We make this assumption for two reasons. First, dialog participants should be able to understand and respond to never before seen belief justifications. That suggests applying general knowledge, such as our jtmtification rules, to analyse and produce specific juJtifications, as that knowledge is likely to be shared by different participants, even if they hold different beliefs about specific courses of action. And second, dialog parlieipants should abo be able io use the same knowledge for different foJks. That suggests that arguments about planning should use the Msne knowledge as planning itsel£ The justifiestion rules for plan-oriented belief1 describe knowledge that a planner would aim find nsdul in welectlng or constructing new plans.
Our approach diffem in two ways fzom previons modeh of participating in dialogs. First, the*¢ models emphe~ised plan recognition: the task of recognising and inferring the underlying plans and goalJ of a dialog paxtlcipant [4, 10, 17, 18, 2] . They view utternnces as providing steps in plans (typically by describing goals or actions) and tie them together by inferring an underlying plan. But in an argument not only must the participant's plans and goals be inferred, but alto their underlying belie/s about those plans and goals. Our approach suggests a model that infers these beliefs as a natural consequence of trying to understand connections between successive diMog utterances. In contrast, existing approaches to inferring participant beliefs take a stated belief and try to reason about possible justifications for it [12, 9] . Previous models have also tended to view providing a dialog response solely as a part of the question answering process. In contrast, our approach suggests that responses arise as a natural consequence of trying to integrate newly-encountered beliefs with current beliefs in memory, and trying to understand any contradictions that result.
Justification Rules
The argumentative dialogs we've examined have two types of plan-oriented beliefs: facts61 and evalusflee [1] . Factual beliefs are objective judgements about planning relationships, such as whether a plan has a particular effect or enablement. They represent the planning knowledge held by moat previous plan-understanding and plan-constructing systems. Evaluative beliefs, on the other hand, are subjective judgements about planning relationJhipe, such as whether or not a plan should be executed. Although these beliefs have generally been ignored by previous systems, they are crucial to participating in arguments involving plan-oriented beliefs.
Our assumption is there exists a small set of justification rules for each planning relationship. Each rule is represented as an abstract configuration of planning relationships that, when instantiated, provides a reason for holding a particular belief. For example, the rule that a plan shouldn't be executed if it conflicts with a preferred plan is represented as:
That is, a plan shouldn't be executed if (1) it interfereB with another plan, and (2) that plan is preferred to it. ]~tee~'ot~ why execuginl~ plan X/n desirable: X iJ the be~t plt~ for g g0al. Executing X h aa enablemeat for n goal.
_Re. a spas why execntinl~ plan X.IS undesirable: X conflicts with a more desirable plan. X has an uadefirable effect. X h~ an undefirable enablemeat.
Remtoua why plan X iJ the best plan for n ~oa]: X hi the only plaza that achiev~ the goal. No plan more desirable than X achieves the goal.
Re~oas why plan X is not the best plan for a goal: X hat an unachievable ensblement. X's execution is undesirable. Some more desirable plan schieve~ the goal.
Rettsons why plan X is more desirable than plan Y: X heat a desirable effect that Y doesn't have. X doesn't have an undesirable effect that Y h~. X doesn't have an undesirable enablement that Y has. Y conflicts with a more desirable plan and X doesn't. X i* an enablement of a mote desirable plan than Y. X has an effect more des~nble than Y.
Re~ons why achieving goal G is undesirable: The only plan for achieving G in undesirable. Achieving G has an undesirable effect S.
Reasons why achieving goal G i~ desirable: Achieving G in an enablement for another goal. Not achieving G has an undesirable effect S. evaluative beliefs (~ee [13] tbr representational details and criteria for dedding what is a reasonable justification rule). These rul¢~ were abstracted from examining a variety of different plan-oriented argumentative dialogs.
The power of these justification rules comes from their generality: A single rule can be instantiated in different ways to provide justifications for different beliefs. In (2), SCRUFFY USes the above rule to justify a belief that the lab members shouldn't clean the lab themselves. In (7), TIDY uses the same rule to justify a belief that the lab members shouldn't transfer money front the salary fnnd. Here, TIDY's justification is that tranderring the money interferes with the more desirable plan of paying researchers.
Recognizing Justifications
The proee~ of understanding a dialog response is modeled as a forwar&chaining search for a chain of instantiated justification rules that (1) contains the user~s stated belief, and (2) jastifies an earlier dialog belief or its negation.
We briefly illustrate this proce~ by showing how SCRUt'FY understands TIDe's response in (3) . The input belief is that the lab members denning the lab is the only plan that achieves the goal of keeping the lab clean. This belief matches an antecedent in a pair of justification rules, so the process begins by inetantiating these rules, resulting in pair of possible justification chains that contain TIDY's stated belief:
(1) the lab members cleaning is the beef plast for ~ep-lag the lab clean becalst it's the only pianist keeping the lab clean, and (2) the lab shonldntl ~ kept c/cart because the only plan for that goal is the wades~ble plan of having the lab members cleaning iL Neither justification directly relates to the dialog, so the next step is to determine which one to pursue further, and whether either can be eliminated from further consideration. Here, the second justification contains a belief that the lab members cleaning the lab is undesirable, which contradicts TIDY's stated belief in ( In general, the understanding proceu it more complex, since justification rules may not be completely instantiated by a single antecedent, and may therefore need to be further iastantiated from beliefs in the dialog context and memory. There ahm may be many possible chains to pursue even e~ter heuristically discarding some of them, requiring the tree of other heuristics to determine which path to follow, such as "Pursue the reasoning chain whidt eoltains the most beliefs found in the dialog eontea~. ~
Selecting A Belief To Justify
After recognizing a participant's reasoning chain, it's necessary to select a belief to justify as a response. This task involves determining which beliefs are not shared, and selecting the negation of one of tho~ beliefs to justify.
An intuitive notion of agreement is that a belief is shared if it it's found in memory or can be justified, and it's not shared if its negation it found in memory or can be justified. But this notion is computationally expensive, since it could conceivably in. volvo trying to justify all the beliefs in the lmrtieipant'a reasoning chain, as well as their negatinas. As ml alternative, our model determines whether a belief is shared by searching memory for the belief and its negation and, if that fails, applying a small Acrl~s DE COLING-gZ NarcH~s, 23-28 Ao(rf 1992set of agreement heuristics. One such heuristic is "Assume a belief is sassed if a justil~ling geaera//zalion is found in tattooer. So, for exanlpie, if the belief "keep everything clean" is found in memory, the belief *keep the AI lab clean ~ is considered to he shared. If no agreement heuristic applies, the belief is simply marked as Uunknown".
After determining whether each belief in the participant's reasoning chain is shared, the model first searches for an existing justification for an unshared belief's negation. If that fails, it then tries to create a new justification for an unshared belief's negation. And if that fails, it tries to create a new justification for the negation of one of the unknown beliefs. This way existing justifications are presented before an attempt is made to construct new ones. If none of these steps succeed, the assumption is that the reaBoning chain is shared, and an attempt is made to form a new justification for the belief it contradicts.
Thus, the belief our model addresses in a response arises from trying to discover whether or not it agrees with another participant's reasoning.
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Forming Justifications
To form a new justification for a belief, our model performs a backward chaining search fo~" a chain of justification rules that justify the given belief and that can be iustantiated with beliefs from memory.
We briefly illustrate this process by showing how SCRU~'Fy forms the response in (2) . The belief to justify is that it's not desirable to have the lab members clean the lab. The first step is to instantiate the justification rules that have this belief as their consequent. That results in several possible justifications: (1) there's an undesirable enablement of cleaning the lab, (2) there's an undesirable effecf of cleaning the lab, or (3) the lab members cleaning the lab conflicts with a more desirable action.
The next step is to try to fully iastantiate one of these rules. Applying the heuristic "Pursue the most instantiafed justification rule" suggests working on the last rule. Here, SCRUFFY instantiates it with a belief from memory that research is more desirable than cleaning. Once a rule is instantiated, it's necessary to verify that the beliefs it contains are shared. Here, that involves verifying that cleaning conflicts with research. It does, so the instantiated rule can be presented an the response.
In general, the process is more complex than outlined here, since not all of the belief in an iustantiated justification rule may be shared, and there may be several ways to instantiate a particular rule. Those rules containing unknown beliefs require further justification, while those rules containing unshared be~ lids can be discarded.
Background
The closest related system is ABDUL/ILANA [8] , which debated the responsibility mad cause for hlstotical events. It focused on the complementary problem of recogniling and providing episodic justifi¢~ tions, rather than justifications b~ed on the rel~. tionships between different plans.
There are several models for recognising the r©-lationship between argument propositions. Cobea's [5] taken each new belief and checks it for a justification relationship with a subset of the previnuslystated belief~ determined through the use of dip sing structure and clue words. That model tureen the existence of an evidence oracle capable of determining whether a justification relationship holds between may pair of beliefs. Our model ira. plements this oracle for a particular clam of planoriented belief justifications. OpFkt [3] recogniset bo. lief justifications in editorials almut economic planning through the use of argument units, a knowb edge structure that can be viewed as complex cow figurations of justification rules. The approaches are complementary, just as scripts [7] and plans [6, 18] are both useful methods for recognising the cam nections between events in a narrative.
Several systems have concentrated on producing belief justifications. Our own earlier work [14, 15, 16] used a primitive form of j~tstification rules for factual beliefs as a template for producing corre~ tive responses for user misconceptions. Our current model extends this work to use these rules in both understanding and responding, and provides additional rules for evaluative beliefs.
ROMPER [11] providas justifications for belidk about an object's class or attributes. But it profides these justifications purely by template matching, not by constructing more general reasoning chains.
Current Status
We've completely implemented the model di~umed in this paper. The program is written in Quintu~ Prolog and runs on an lIP/APOLLO workstation. Its input is a representation for a stated participant belief, and its output is a representation for m, up. propriate response. It currently includes 30 justitka~ tips rules and over 400 beliefs about various plans. We've used the program to participate in short ar-. gumentative dialogs in two disparate domains: dayto~day planning in the A! lab, and removing and recovering files in UNIX. We're currently using it to experiment with different heuristics for controlling the search process involved in rer.ognisbtg and c~u.-strutting these reasoning ch~in~.
Our xxmdcl he~ eevt.L'~l /~ey Ib~dt~tion~ ~e e~e c,~_dy
AcrEs DE COLING-92, NAN1q~, 23-28 hofrr 1992 9 0 9 P toct 1: COLING.9"~ ~qt, l,~'n!s, Aut;. 23-28, 1992 now starting to addrem. First, it views plans as atomic units and comiders only a small set of "all or nothing" plan-oriented beliefs. This means it can't produce or understand justifications involving atel~ in a plan, conditional planning relationships, or beliefs not directly involving plans. Second, our model can understand only those responses that jnstify an earlier belief. It can't, for example, understand a response that contradicts an inferred justification for an earlier belief. These more complex relationships can be represented using juetificntinn rules, but our model must be extended to recognise them. Third, our model is reactive rather than initiatory: it produces respon~ only when there's n perceived din-. agreement. It needs to be extended to know why its in an argument, and to be aware of the underlying goals of the other argument participants.
Conclusions
Previous dialog models have focused primarily on recognising a participant's plans and goals. But to participate in an argument it's also necessary to recognize when participants are providing beliefs about their planl and goals and how they're justifying these beliefs. It's also necessary to be able to determine which beliefs require further justification and to formulate justifications for these beliefs. This paper suggests a knowledge-based approach for these tasks. Our approach has several attractive features. Firs L it builds It model of many relevant but unstated participant beliefs as a side-effect of trying to relate their utterance to the dialog. Second, it decides which belief to address in n response as a natural consequence of trying to understand why it disagrees with another participant's belief. Third, it understands belief jnstifieations using the same general, common-sense planning knowledge that it uses to formulate them. Finally, it suggests how never before seen belief justiflcatinns can be understood, so long as they were formed from general justification rules known to the participants. That ability is crucial for participating in dialogs whose participants hold differing beliefs.
